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Abstract 
This paper provides an illustration of the changing tolerance for inequality in a context of 
radical political and economic transformation and rapid economic growth. We focus on the 
Polish experience of transition and explore self-declared attitudes of the citizens. Using 
monthly representative surveys of the population, realized by the Polish poll institute (CBOS) 
from 1992 to 2005, we identify a structural break in the relation between income inequality 
and subjective evaluation of well-being. The downturn in the tolerance for inequality (1997) 
coincides with the increasing distrust of political elites. 
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“The rulers are not necessarily given any advance notice about (…) 
the time at which they ought to be on the lookout for a drastically 
different climate of public and popular opinion; on the contrary, they 
are lulled into complacency by the easy early stage when everybody 
seems to be enjoying the very process that will later be vehemently 
denounced and damned as one consisting essentially in “the rich 
becoming richer” (Hirschman and Rothschild , 1973, p.552). 
 
Introduction 
Does inequality spoil welfare benefits of growth? And if so, can it reduce popular support for 
economic reforms? In this paper, we show that during a period of rapid economic growth 
accompanied by important income differentiation, the tolerance for inequality can evolve over 
time and become a factor of unhappiness and dissatisfaction De facto, in Central and Eastern 
European countries, which engaged at the beginning of the 1990s in a process of profound 
political and economic transformation, “reform fatigue” and disenchantment (Kornai, 2006; 
Desai et Olofsgärd, 2006) appeared after a couple of years of significant achievements. 
Despite important successes in building democratic and market institutions, despite 
continuous economic growth and increasing level of prosperity, despite joining NATO and 
the European Union, the mood of public opinion changed at the end of the last century. 
Growing tensions between democracy and liberalism and the rise of populist parties was 
observed in several countries of the region (Krastev, 2007). Popular discontent was fueled by 
increasing public distrust of political elites viewed as corrupt and self-interested.  
We focus on the experience of Poland, which, after 45 years of communism, has engaged, 
since 1989, in a process of radical transformation (Sachs, 1993). This peaceful and negotiated 
“refolution” 
1 consisting in the twin transition towards democracy and a market economy  
brought about radical changes of attitudes and expectations. Initially, the process relied on 
high expectations and massive support from the population. Immense hopes were entrusted in 
the mere abandon of socialism.  In the middle of the 1990s, however, this consensual period 
started to close down and the initial enthusiasm gave way to disappointment: expectations 
                                                 
1 This is a term used by Garton Ash (1989) to describe the combination of gradual reforms and revolutionary 
change.    3
began to be confronted with experience. Progressively, criticisms of some outcomes of 
transition, including corruption, growing inequality 
2 and the high price paid by the losers of 
transition, became the dominant theme of public discourse.  
In a premonitory paper, Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) suggested that societies 
experiencing rapid development may initially show tolerance for higher inequality, because it 
is interpreted in terms of greater opportunities. Even the increase in other people’s income is 
then seen as encouraging information about each person’s prospects. However, the authors 
also argued that the tolerance for inequality may wither away with time: if their expectations 
are not met, supporters of the process of development may become enemies. This may also 
happen when people acquire a more precise vision of their place and destiny in society. After 
such a “turning point”, the side-effects of development, in particular the increase in 
inequality, may overcompensate subjective benefits of growth.  
Most of the existing literature has documented the relation between income inequality and 
satisfaction in given environments, sometimes in a comparative static approach, contrasting 
Europe and the United-States (Alesina et al., 2004) or the Old Europe versus the New Europe 
and the United States (Senik, 2005). The experience of eighteen years of transition now 
makes it possible to investigate how the relation between inequality and satisfaction evolved 
over time.  
Taking advantage of a long Polish dataset with high frequency (bi-monthly), covering the 
period 1992 - 2005, we explore the evolution of subjective attitudes of the Polish citizens 
during the initial and later stages of transition. We hinge on the self-declared satisfaction with 
the state of the Polish economy (henceforth “country satisfaction”), which is both a 
satisfaction category and a political attitude. We also use two other self-declared satisfaction 
variables: 1/ “satisfaction with the living conditions of one’s family (henceforth “private 
satisfaction”), and 2/ expectations concerning the living conditions of one’s family in the near 
future (“private expectations”). 
                                                 
2 The rise of income inequality in transition countries has been documented and explained by, for instance, 
Brainerd (1998), Milanovic (1998, 1999) or Kornai (2006).    4
The main objective of this paper is to test whether the scenario sketched by Hirschman and 
Rothschild can explain the surprising hump shape of average satisfaction in Poland, in a 
context of strong and permanent national income growth. As shown by Figure 1 (section 3), 
individual satisfaction, especially satisfaction with the economic situation of the country, 
initially follows the rise in GDP, but at a certain point located around 1996-1997, dissociates 
from GDP and even starts declining.  
If this evolution is explained by Hirschman and Rothschild’s conjecture, we should be able to 
identify a structural break in the relationship between satisfaction and inequality over time: in 
the first period, country satisfaction and private expectations should increase with inequality 
because the latter is essentially interpreted as an increase in the scope of opportunities. 
However in a second stage, the impact of income inequality should become negative. We thus 
test for the existence of such a breakpoint. We do not impose the date of this possible 
discontinuity: instead, we look over the entire series and use the sup-Wald test (Andrews 
1993) to identify the existence and the location of the breakpoint. 
The result of the test indicates that the point of break is situated at the end of year 1996. 
Consequently, we look at the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction before 
and after the time of change. It turns out that popular satisfaction with the country’s economic 
situation initially improves with the rise in income inequality but is negatively affected by 
inequality later on. The relationship between income inequality and individuals’ expectations 
concerning the future situation of their households follows a similar pattern: in the first 
period, inequality is associated with higher expectations; in the second period, it ceases to 
affect expectations, suggesting that it looses its informational value in the eyes of the 
population. Finally, income inequality significantly reduces private satisfaction after 1996, 
whereas it does not exert a significant impact before that date. 
 Dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country is also reflected by other political 
attitudes. We find that the percentage of people who self-position themselves on the extremes 
of the political spectrum has significantly increased since 1996. More evidence on the 
evolution of public opinions suggests that the changing tolerance for inequality coincides with 
the increasingly widespread perception that high incomes are due to corruption and other 
unfair processes.     5
The next section reviews the related literature, section 2 summarizes the evolution of the 
political situation in Poland, section 3 presents the data, section 4 discusses the empirical 
strategy, section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
1. Literature  
This paper is situated at the cross-road of several strands of the literature. It takes its 
motivation from the political economy of development that focuses on income inequality. A 
frequent claim is that inequality and the demand for redistribution that it generates constitute 
an obstacle on the way to economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 
1994): concerns for income distribution may hinder the adhesion of citizens to the deepening 
of market reforms or development policies, when growth is accompanied by income 
inequality, as suggested by the Kuznets curve (1955). Alesina and Perotti (1993) provide 
empirical evidence that income inequality fuels social discontent and instability. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000, 2002) argue that much of the historical evolutions in nineteen century’s 
Europe, in particular the extension of voting rights that led to unprecedented redistributive 
programs, can be viewed as a strategy of the elite to avoid political unrest and revolution, 
which in turn was fed by rising inequalities due to economic development and 
industrialization. 
We address this issue with the tools of the “happiness literature” that analyzes the self-
declared satisfaction and attitudes of individuals. The paper first relates to an important body 
of literature which concentrates on the relationship between income distribution and self-rated 
happiness. Most of these studies find that the degree of individuals’ inequality aversion 
depends on their perception of income mobility, i.e. on their beliefs concerning the factors of 
economic success and failure (Alesina et al. 2001; Fong 2001; Alesina and la Ferrara 2005; 
Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Alesina et al. (2004) show that inequality does not affect life 
satisfaction of American people, while it reduces self-declared happiness of Europeans; this is 
because « … in the U.S., the poor see inequality as a ladder that, although steep, may be 
climbed, while in Europe the poor see that ladder as more difficult to ascend ». Sanfey and 
Teksoz (2007) also find that in transition countries, income inequality has a positive impact 
on life satisfaction, whereas the impact is negative in other countries of the World Values 
Survey.    6
The nodal question of the happiness literature is the subjective welfare impact of income: own 
income as well as income distribution. This is because its first and foremost motivation comes 
from the so-called Easterlin paradox, i.e., the empirical observation that national average self-
declared happiness does not increase during periods of national income growth (Easterlin 
2001). The current paper shares this type of interrogation, as its objective is to explain why 
the satisfaction of Polish citizens fell in the late mid-1990’s whereas GDP continued to 
increase.  
With similar objectives and method, other articles situated at the intersection of the growing 
happiness literature and the vast transition literature, have analyzed the specific structure and 
evolution of satisfaction during the transition process. These include, inter alia, Sanfey et 
Teksoz (2007), Kornai (2006), Easterlin and Zimmermann (2006), Guriev and Zhuravskaia 
(2007), Easterlin (2008), etc. One of the principal issues addressed by these papers is the 
weaker relation, ceteris paribus, between income growth and life satisfaction in transition 
countries, as compared to non-transition countries. Other papers have used the experience of 
transition as a sort of giant « natural experiment » in order to study the welfare effects of more 
specific changes, such as increased household income (Graham and Pettinato 2002, Frijters, 
Haisken-de-New and Shields 2004), inequality (Ravallion and Lokshin 2000, Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schuendeln 2007) and income comparisons (Ferrer-i-Carbonnel 2004, Senik 2004, 
2005).  
Following the research direction opened by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), this paper 
explores the dynamic aspect of the relation between development, income inequality and 
subjective welfare during some eighteen years of transition in Poland. Our main hypothesis is 
that the fall in self-declared satisfaction in the late 1990’s is due to the rise in inequality and 
the way income differentiation is interpreted by Polish citizens.    7
2. The evolution of political attitudes in Poland  
The evolution of public opinion in Poland is reflected to some extent in the results of 
parliamentary elections (Table 1). The constant reshuffling of the political supply 
notwithstanding, one clear trend is the growing influence of left-wing parties up to 2001 and 
the declining support to liberal pro-reform parties.  
A particular inflexion in the voting behavior is visible after 1997. It coincides with the 
announcement by the newly appointed centre-right government of a wave of second-
generation welfare state reforms (related to health, pensions and education), met with 
reluctance by the population. The spectacular upsurge in the votes for the left in the next 
elections in 2001, and the important increase in the support for an openly populist party 
Samoobrona, can both be interpreted as protest votes against the policy of the coalition 
government of AWS/UW, in power between 1997 and 2001. In the 2005 elections, the 
support to the left-wing parties, in power from 2001 to 2005, shrinks from 41% to 15%; this 
defeat is clearly a price paid for the budgetary discipline imposed during the process of 
accession to the European Union. It is also related to the outbreak of several corruption 
scandals (Freedom House, 2005). In the same time, two right-wing parties, the national-
conservative Law and Justice (PiS) and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) triple 
and double their score. Law and Justice wins the election addressing its electoral campaign to 
the losers of transition and underlining the opposition between “Poland of Solidarity” and 
“liberal Poland”. Negative outcomes of reforms, such as corruption and social stratification 
are in the center of electoral debates.  
Several public opinion polls reflect the weakening of the political support for reforms after 
1997. Figure 1 drawing on a Public Opinion Research Center survey (CBOS, 2003) shows 
that the tolerance for “large income inequality”, as a counterpart of “future well-being” and 
“economic progress” increases until 1997, then falls. The same pattern is observed for the 
belief that “energetic entrepreneurs should be remunerated well in order to ensure the growth 
of the Polish economy”, and to a lesser extent the belief that “future well-being in Poland 
requires remunerating well those who work hard”. By contrast, the opinion that “the 
government should reduce differences between high and low wages” gains popularity after 
1997 onwards. Finally, the number of citizens who declare that “inequalities of income are 
too large in Poland” increases after 1998. The same pattern is visible in the data collected by   8
the New Europe Barometer surveys
3. These data show that in Poland, the proportion of 
individuals who declare that “incomes should be made equal so that there is no great 
difference in income” rather than “individual achievement should determine how much 
people are paid; more successful should be paid more” rises from 24% in 1992 to 32% in 
1998 and 54% in 2004. 
Figure 2, using another CBOS survey (CBOS, 2004), displays the proportion of the 
population which considers corruption as an important problem. Such feeling increased 
sharply and in 2004 reached 75 percent. More generally it seems that in Poland, the 
perception of the population concerning the fairness and efficiency of the process of income 
generation has deteriorated during the period under observation, with a visible turning point 
around 1997. 
3. Data  
The dataset we use was constructed from individual level surveys implemented by CBOS in 
Poland
4. We exploit 84 surveys of randomly chosen representative samples of the Polish adult 
population, consisting of approximately 1,000-1,300 interviews, covering the period 1992-
2005 (six surveys per year). Even though some variables were available for earlier years, we 
choose to start our study in 1992, i.e. when GDP growth resumes after two years of 
significant decline. A standard set of questions were regularly asked: gender, age, education, 
location of residence, labor market status, and socio-professional categories. In terms of 
income, the best documented and more complete notion available in the dataset is the net total 
monthly household income per capita declared by surveyed individuals. It includes all 
revenues from individuals’ main job, including bonuses, rewards, various additional 
remunerations, revenues from other jobs, including sporadic contracts, disability and old-age 
pensions, fellowships and other revenues. People were asked to indicate their net monthly 
average income per capita over the last three months. We use this notion of income and 
                                                 
3 Questionnaires and descriptive statistics are available at  http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/nebo.shtml. These 
surveys were conducted by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Aberdeen. 
4 The explanation of sample design can be found at http://www.cbos.pl/EN/About_us/design.shtml.   9
deflate it using monthly consumer price index published by the Polish Central Statistical 
Office (GUS). The evolution of the average income per capita is displayed in Figure 3. 
The data also contain specific attitudinal questions; we use three questions (recoded in order 
to put the answers in ascending order of satisfaction): 
5 
•  Country satisfaction: How do you evaluate the economic situation in Poland? 
Respondents could tick one out of five possible answers: very good/good/neither good 
nor bad /bad/ very bad. 
•  Private satisfaction: How are your life and your family’s life? Proposed answers: Very 
good/ good /neither good nor bad/bad /very bad. 
•  Private expectations: Do you think that in the coming year, you and your family will 
live: much better than now/a little bit better/the same as now/a little bit worse/much 
worse. 
We complete the CBOS data with macroeconomic data taken from official sources (GUS): 
yearly GDP, yearly GDP deflator, and monthly unemployment rate. 
We compute the Gini coefficient of income inequality using the successive surveys of the 
dataset. This measure of inequality is of “high quality” as defined by Deininger and Squire 
(1996): it is calculated on the basis of successive representative samples of the population and 
takes into account all sources of revenues
6.  
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Tables A1 - A3 in the Appendix. During 
the period 1992-2005, the economy grew at an average rate of 3.5 percent. More precisely, the 
average GDP growth rate reached 6 percent between 1992 and 1997; it then slightly fell to 4.8 
percent between 1997 and 2005. In the meanwhile, other processes unfold such as the rise of 
unemployment and of inequality. Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was 
                                                 
5 The correlation between the three questions is around 0.3. 
6 Our measure of income inequality turns out to be slightly higher than the Gini coefficient for Poland calculated, 
for instance, by UNICEFF (see table A3 in the appendix): the difference may be due to the fact that 1/ UNICEFF 
gives yearly measures while our data allows estimating Gini per month, and 2/ we use monthly CPI.     10
0.32 at the beginning of 1992 and reached 0.38 at the end of 2005.  See Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
Figure 3 displays yearly averages of the main variables of interest, i.e. country satisfaction, 
private expectations, private satisfaction, real GDP and the Gini coefficient. The data suggest 
that although real GDP has been continuously increasing since 1992, satisfaction with the 
country’s economic situation improved only up to 1997, and then declined substantially until 
2002, with a slight improvement after this date. The curves of private satisfaction and 
expectations have a similar shape, but with a smaller amplitude. Private satisfaction and 
private expectations have a tendency to adapt to shocks and return to a baseline level of 
happiness (Clark et al., forthcoming). By contrast, country satisfaction is a more political 
variable; it expresses citizens’ judgments about the economic policy of the government. As 
such, it is more volatile and less subject to adaptation effects.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
Looking for a possible structural break in the relationship between individuals’ subjective 
satisfaction and inequality we neither make a priori assumption about the existence of the 
break, nor impose the date of a possible discontinuity. Instead, we take the breakpoint as 
endogenous. As Wald tests constructed with breaks treated as a parameter do not possess their 
standard large sample asymptotic distributions, we use sup-Wald test based on the maximum 
of a sequence of Wald statistics and use critical values coming from Andrews (1993) 
7. 
The basic regression we want to estimate is: 
Sit = aT Ginit +a1 Xit +a2 γT+ a3 trend + a4 νj + eit (1) 
where Sit denotes the satisfaction of individual i in date t (alternatively: satisfaction with the 
economic situation of the country, private satisfaction and private expectations); Ginit is a 
measure of inequality calculated for each representative cross-section; Xit is a vector of socio-
                                                 
7 The critical values from Andrews (1993) are widely used in formal tests of parameter stability. Also see Bai 
and Perron (1998).    11
economic characteristics of individual i in date t consisting of age, age squared, gender, 
education, occupation, labor market status and other professional categories, household 
income per capita and location of residence; γT denotes yearly dummies capturing the general 
macroeconomic and other circumstances that affect all individuals in a given year; νj denotes 
region dummies controlling for unequal territorial developments, and eit is the error term. As 
satisfaction variables are ordinal, we estimate equation (1) using an ordered logit model. We 
pool the individual observations of various surveys, and cluster by cross-section so as to 
adjust standard errors for intra-survey correlations
8. 
We test the hypothesis that the parameter on the Gini (at) remains the same over the entire 
period. Consequently, we use a partial structural change model constraining the coefficients 
of the other explanatory variables to be the same for all the periods. In other words, some 
parameters are taken as constant under H0 and H1. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we want 
to find the location of the break point. Specifically, 
H0: aT = a* for all T  
H1: aT = a1 for T = 1992 , …, T
B  
      aT =  a2 for T = T
B+1,…, 2005 
We move T
B from 1993 to 2004 trimming the sample for about 15% (i.e. leaving at least 15% 
of the sample before the break, and, symmetrically, after the break) and compute the Wald 
statistic for each value of T
B in order to test whether the regression coefficient on the Gini 
estimated over the sub-period [1992, T
B] is equal to the coefficient estimated over the sub-
period [T
B+1, 2005]. We calculate the Wald statistic over all possible breakpoints and 
compare the maximal value with the relevant critical value (taken from Andrews 1993). If the 
sup Wald statistic is lower than the critical value, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
zero breaks. If the maximal Wald statistic exceeds the critical value, the test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients. We then divide the sample into two parts at the estimated 
breakpoint and perform a parameter constancy test for each sub sample. If the hypothesis of 
                                                 
8 Clustering is important to make sure that we do not exaggerate the statistical significance of those RHS 
variables which have a higher level of aggregation than the LHS variable.    12
no break in the sub-samples cannot be rejected, we regress equation (1) separately on each 
sub-sample.  
5. Results 
We first check whether regressing satisfaction variables on the usual individual level 
characteristics provides results consistent with the literature (see for example Di Tella, 
MacCulloch and Oswald 2003, Blanchflower 2008). As expected (Table A4 in the Annex), 
we find a U shaped relationship between age and satisfaction, a positive impact of income, 
education, and higher occupations. Men are happier than women, a frequent observation in 
Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America, as opposed to Western Europe and the 
United States (Graham and Pettinato 2002; di Tella et al., 2003, Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 
2007, Blanchflower, 2008, Easterlin, 2008, Georgellis et al., forthcoming). People who live in 
rural areas are more satisfied and optimistic about their future standard of living than 
inhabitants of urban agglomerations, who, in turn, are more satisfied than those who live in 
large cities. By contrast, individuals who live in the countryside view the situation of the 
country in a more pessimistic way.  
In order to identify a discontinuity in the relation between income inequality and subjective 
attitudes, we test the existence and the location of a possible breakpoint, as explained in 
section 4. For country satisfaction, the highest value of the Wald test is 16.93 and it 
corresponds to T
B = 1996 (the critical value is 8.85 at 5% level). Concerning the relationship 
between private expectations and inequality, the sup-Wald test is 9.86 and it is also obtained 
for T
B = 1996. 
Concerning the relation between private satisfaction and inequality, the tests do not allow 
identifying a breakpoint endogenously
9. However, if we impose 1996 as a point of break, a 
simple Wald test of equality of the parameters on the Gini index leads to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of the equality of parameters in the two periods [1992, 1996] and [1997, 
2005]. This test based on an exogenously given date is less powerful than the previous Wald 
                                                 
9 We believe that the reason why the relationship between private satisfaction and inequality is different from 
that between country satisfaction and inequality is because private satisfaction mainly depends on personal 
circumstances and specific dynamics such as adaptation or homeostatic mechanisms of return to a baseline level, 
which partly isolate it from external circumstances such as income distribution.   13
test. We thus treat the results pertaining to private satisfaction with some caution. Finally, we 
perform a parameter constancy test for each sub sample obtained
10 and do not find additional 
breaks. 
Table 2 displays the estimation of equation (1) for the three different satisfaction variables on 
the two sub-periods: 1992-1996 and 1997-2005. The impact of the Gini coefficient on the 
evaluation of the country’s situation is significantly positive before 1997 (column 1) and 
becomes significantly negative afterwards (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show individuals’ 
expectations concerning their living conditions. Our measure of inequality exerts a 
significantly positive impact on expectations up to 1997, and then stops exerting any 
influence. This suggests that inequality is initially associated with an opening of new 
opportunities, but loses this signification in the eyes of the population in the later stage of 
transition.  Finally, private satisfaction is initially weakly influenced by inequality. In the 
second period however, the coefficient on the Gini becomes significantly negative (columns 5 
and 6). Obviously, the interpretation of income inequality has changed during the period 
under observation, with a visible inflexion in 1997.  
As we already stressed, the subjective assessment of the country’s situation is a political 
variable as much as a satisfaction variable. A natural question is thus whether the negative 
impact of the Gini coefficient on the country’s satisfaction is reflected in political attitudes. In 
Section 2, we reported evidence about the changing attitudes towards income differentiation 
and the perception of corruption. In order to go further, we explore another question included 
in the CBOS survey: “Can you describe your political opinions? Please, use the scale 1 to 7, 
1 meaning left and 7 meaning right”. We assume that the percentage of the respondents who 
position themselves at the extreme left of the political scale approximately captures the radical 
rejection of liberal reforms. As illustrated by Figure 4, this percentage follows the increase of 
the Gini coefficient. It then drops after 2001, when the right-wing party Law and Justice wins 
the election with strongly pro-redistributive and anti-corruption program (see section 3). 
These results suggest that the weakening tolerance for inequality does affect political attitudes 
of the citizens.  
 
                                                 
10 See Bai and Perron (1998).   14
Robustness checks 
In order to make sure that the decline in country satisfaction and other subjective 
appreciations is actually due to the changing tolerance for inequality, we firstly assess the 
influence of other macro-economic variables, such as GDP growth, unemployment or 
inflation. Table 3 shows that including the annual rate of real GDP growth (panel A), the 
monthly rate of unemployment (panel B) or the monthly rate of inflation (panel C) does not 
alter the result concerning the changing influence of inequality on subjective attitudes.  
Secondly, we check whether considering the impact of inequality on pure time effects 
(controlling for all individual level characteristics) does not alter the results. We proceed in 
two steps. First, we estimate satisfaction variables on individual personal characteristics of 
equation (1) including date fixed effects. We then take the vector of estimated date fixed 
effects and regress it on the corresponding Gini coefficient.  
The impact of income inequality remains significantly positive before 1997 and negative 
thereafter. Controlling for the monthly rate of unemployment or the monthly rate of inflation 
does not alter the influence of income inequality (Table 4). Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 
show that the impact of unemployment on country satisfaction is similar to that of income 
inequality. It is positive in the first period, and negative in the second period. This is not very 
surprising, as unemployment is another facet of inequality. The initial rise in unemployment 
may have been interpreted as the sign of a necessary process of industrial restructuring 
favorable for future growth, whereas the subsequent deepening of labor lay-offs gave way to a 
more pessimistic perception. Concerning the monthly rate of inflation, Table 3 shows that its 
impact is basically insignificant. 
We also check for a possible effect of seasonality by including monthly dummies. Their 
inclusion does affect the results (Table A5 in the Appendix).  
The question could also be asked whether the changing tolerance for inequality is not due to 
the reduced importance of the welfare state. The tolerance for inequality certainly depends on 
the importance of the redistribution program and the social protection system. Keane and 
Prasad (2002), following Garner and Terrel (1998), argued that at the beginning of transition, 
important social transfers have compensated the increasing wage differentiation. They 
suggested that, the mechanisms of social transfers were critical in obtaining political support   15
for reforms. Their period of observation stops in 1997, but official statistics show that the 
share of social expenditure in GDP has decreased from about 26% to about 23% between 
1991 and 1997, and then stabilized around this level. Hence, the changing tolerance for 
inequality does not seem to be associated with the withering away of the welfare state. 
Finally, we check whether the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of 
inequality. It could be argued that people have more locally determined view of income 
distribution and that the Gini coefficient calculated at the country level does not measure the 
level of inequality that is actually perceived by the population. Hence, we calculate income 
inequality for different locations of residence: large cities (greater than 100 000 inhabitants), 
smaller cities and rural areas. As shown in Table 5, the results are not altered when we use 
this measure of inequality: the sign of the Gini coefficient changes after 1996 in the 
regression of country satisfaction; inequality stops serving as a support for expectations 
starting in 1997, and private satisfaction becomes negatively affected by inequality after 1996.  
We have also checked that the same pattern is preserved when the measure of inequality is 
computed as the standard deviation of log household income for each cross section: in the 
estimation of country satisfaction, the coefficient on this measure is 0.001*** before 1997 
and -0.001** after 1996; in the estimation of private expectations, the coefficient is 0.002*** 
before 1997 and 0.000 after. Finally, in the estimation of private satisfaction, the coefficient is 
0.000 before 1997 and -0.001*** afterwards. 
Alternatively, instead of looking at the impact of income inequality in general, as measured 
by the Gini coefficient, we use a notion of reference income, constructed as the average 
income by type of locality for each cross-section (see for example Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2004). This category of average income can play the role of a comparison benchmark or of a 
basis of expectations
11. Including this notion of reference income together with own 
household income per capita in the estimation of equation (1), we check whether the impact 
of this “reference income” on country satisfaction follows the same pattern as the Gini 
coefficient. 
                                                 
11 See Senik (2005) for a detailed presentation of the argument   16
Table 6 displays the coefficients on reference income and household income per capita. It 
shows that while the coefficient on household income is always positive, the coefficient on 
reference income is significantly negative after 1996 in the regression of the country’s 
satisfaction, while it is significantly positive in the initial period (columns 1 and 2). Reference 
income ceases to be interpreted as a support for expectations (columns 3 and 4) and it exerts a 
negative impact on private satisfaction after 1996 (column 6). 
These results confirm that the parallel process of income growth and differentiation was 
initially well accepted by Polish citizens who might have seen it as a promise of future shared 
gains. However, in the late mid-1990’s, these feelings based on high expectations seem to 
have given way to more negative attitudes fed by the rising intolerance for income inequality. 
Iin spite of the continued increase in the average income, satisfaction with the economic 
situation of the country, expectations and private satisfaction have started to decline. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of the influence of income inequality on individuals’ view about 
the economic situation of the country, which can partly be interpreted as a measure of 
people’s support for reforms. Income inequality is initially perceived as a positive signal 
about increased opportunities, but after a couple of years of rapid economic transformation, 
accumulated unfulfilled expectations and the diminishing patience of citizens bring about a 
change in attitudes: growing inequality starts undermining satisfaction. People have become 
disappointed with the process of transformation and skeptical about the legitimacy of the 
enrichment of the winners of reforms. Various public opinion surveys confirm the changing 
popular opinions about the degree of corruption in the country and the desirability of high 
pay-offs for certain professions. Hence, the turning point in the tolerance for income 
inequality seems to come with the increasingly wide perception that the process that generates 
income distribution is unfair. 
The findings of this paper constitute a link between the literature on subjective satisfaction 
and the political economy literature that focuses on inequality and growth. It provides, from 
the “internal” subjective point of view of citizens, some evidence of the mechanism, 
hypothesized for instance by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) or Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), that growth that is accompanied by inequality generates dissatisfaction.   17
Dissatisfaction, in turn, can create a political opposition to the deepening of reforms.  
The results obtained in this paper offer important lessons for developing and transition 
countries: if it is important for governments to rapidly exploit the initial “window of 
opportunity” for reforms, it is also crucial that they adopt careful redistributive policies early 
in the process, in order to ensure durable popular support to reforms. But the findings of this 
paper also provide lessons for developed countries. They remind how important it is to make 
sure that the functioning of the market and the process of income differentiation are perceived 
as fair and transparent.   18
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Figure 1. Opinions concerning income inequality: Poland 1994-2003  
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Percentage of people who agree with the statements indicated in the legend. Source: CBOS (2003).   22
Figure 2. Is corruption an important problem? Poland 1991-2004 (%) 
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Question asked: “In your opinion, how important is the corruption problem in Poland: very important/rather 
important/not very important/not important”. Source: CBOS (2004).    23
Figure 3. Satisfaction variables, GDP and inequality, 1992-2005 (yearly averages) 
 
Figure 4. Income inequality and self-identification at the extreme left 
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Table 1: Scores obtained by main political parties in parliamentary elections in Poland 1991-
2005  
  
1991 
 
1993 
 
1997 
 
2001 
 
2005 
 
Left-wing  parties  11.99 27.69 31.87 41.04 15.31 
Liberal  parties  19.81 14.58 13.37 15.78 26.59 
AWS -  -  33.83  5.60  - 
Agrarian  parties  14.14  17.77  7.31 8.98 6.96 
Samoobrona -  2.78  0.08  10.20  11.41 
PC/PiS 8.71  4.42  -  9.50  26.99 
Other  right**  21.98  11.18  5.56 7.87 7.97 
 
 
Source: Our compilation based on data from the State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/). Left-
wing parties include SLD, Unia Pracy and SdPl. Agrarian parties include PSL and PSL-Porozumienie Ludowe. 
Liberal parties include UD/UW/PD, KLD and PO. AWS was a large coalition of right-wing parties around 
Solidarity trade union. Other right includes mostly right wing catholic parties, and some radically anticommunist 
and populist parties. See the description of Polish political parties in the Appendix for more details. 
 
 
Table 2. A breakpoint in the relation between inequality and satisfaction. Ordered logit 
Country satisfaction  Private expectations  Private satisfaction 
 
 
1992-1996 1997-2005  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
         
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Gini 6.402***  -6.199***  8.981***  0.258  0.627  -2.844** 
  [2.100] [2.170]  [2.156] [1.352] [0.898] [1.397] 
         
Nb of 
observations 
30520 43061  27115 40435 32357 45335 
chi2 3240601  9383  31416  41941  18861  26526 
Pseudo  R2  0.06 0.06  0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 
log  likelihood  -34891.44 -50214.02  -32677.07 -44364.70 -34828.81 -47973.66 
Controls include gender, age, age squared, education, location of residence, employment status, occupation, regional 
dummies, time trend, and yearly dummies. All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at each cross-section. Asterisks 
*, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level.     25
Table 3.   Satisfaction and inequality, controlling for other macroeconomic variables.  
               Ordered logit 
  
Country satisfaction 
 
Private expectations 
 
Private satisfaction 
 
 1992-1996  1997-2005  1992-1996  1997-2005  1992-1996  1997-2005 
 
Panel A        
Gini 5.398**  -9.459***  8.814***  -1.835  1.026  -3.421** 
 [2.298]  [2.655]  [3.089]  [2.489]  [1.106]  [1.346] 
GDP growth  -0.009  0.189***  0.035  0.072***  0.046**  0.064*** 
 [0.041]  [0.020]  [0.059]  [0.017]  [0.020]  [0.009] 
Nb of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
chi2 8831  2795  4445  3152  9414  21211 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.10  0.12 
log likelihood  -34911  -50670  -32695  -44553  -34846  -48019 
 
Panel B 
      
Gini 5.914***  -5.709***  8.411***  0.269  0.611  -2.814** 
 [1.872]  [2.202]  [2.353]  [1.326]  [0.901]  [1.391] 
Regional 
unemployment 
-0.008***  -0.016***  -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Nb of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
chi2 1972145  9627  9451  4815  22850  28663 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.10  0.12 
log likelihood  -34912  -50204  -32699  -44364  -34829  -47973 
            
Panel C        
Gini 5.809***  -6.648***  8.373***  -0.038  0.638  -2.863** 
 [1.777]  [2.248]  [2.302]  [1.352]  [0.905]  [1.366] 
Inflation 0.022 0.079**  0.015 0.033*  0.011  0.003 
 [0.022]  [0.039]  [0.043]  [0.018]  [0.011]  [0.030] 
Nb of 
observations 
30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
chi2 435180  8314  56413478  5017  11296  26615 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.10  0.12 
log likelihood  -34915  -50207  -32698  -44363  -34828  -47974 
Controls include gender, age, age squared, education, location of residence, employment status, occupation, 
regional dummies, and yearly dummies in intermediate and lower panels. All standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered at each cross-section. Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
  
Table 4. The role of inequality in explaining dates fixed effects,  OLS regressions 
              
  Country satisfaction  Private expectations  Private satisfaction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
              
Gini  4.840**  -4.950*  5.884**  -6.799**  7.880*  0.545 9.583**  0.161 0.719 -2.474*  0.676 -2.595** 
  [2.188] [2.552] [2.323] [2.550] [4.033] [1.653] [4.234] [1.598] [1.018] [1.269] [0.969] [1.245] 
              
Regional  unemployment  0.094**  -0.095**    0.152*  -0.013    -0.003  -0.004    
  [0.043] [0.045]     [0.080] [0.028]     [0.020] [0.022]    
Monthly  inflation  rate    0.020  0.083*    0.015  0.034    0.012  0.010 
      [0.027] [0.048]     [0.049] [0.030]     [0.011] [0.024] 
Nb of observations  29 53 29 53 29 53 29 53 29 53 29 53 
R-squared  0.946 0.914 0.936 0.911 0.621 0.779 0.560 0.785 0.925 0.752 0.929 0.753 
F-stat  64.72 44.36 54.01 42.76 6.00  14.81 4.66  15.31 45.30 12.76 47.62 12.82 
Yearly dummies included  Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level.  
Table 5.  Satisfaction and inequality by location of residence. Ordered logit 
    
Country satisfaction 
 
Private expectations 
 
Private satisfaction 
 
  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 
Local Gini   1,914***  -2,396***  3,545***  -0,793  0,288  -1,175** 
  [0,736] [0,892] [1.071] [0,630] [0,452] [0,511] 
Nb of observations  30520  43061  27115  40435  32357  45335 
chi2  8321127  6299 1905 4251 28509  25201 
Pseudo  R2 0,05 0,06 0,02 0,04 0,1  0,12 
log  likelihood -34916 -50225 -32740 -44363 -34829 -47975 
Controls include gender, age, age squared, education, location of residence, employment status, 
occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and yearly dummies. Local Gini is calculated for different 
location of residence: large cities (greater than 100 000 inhabitants), smaller cities and rural areas. All 
standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at each cross-section. Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
 
Table 6.  Satisfaction and reference income. Ordered logit 
    
Country satisfaction 
 
Private expectations 
  
 
Private satisfaction 
  1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 1992-1996 1997-2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference  income  1.662* -1.555**  2.756***  0.409  0.039 -1.053*** 
  [0.886] [0.656] [1.065] [0.483] [0.283] [0.322] 
Household  income per capita  0.326***  0.336***  0.297***  0.361***  1.274***  1.293*** 
  [0.025] [0.022] [0.034] [0.021] [0.034] [0.019] 
Nb  of  observations  30520 43061 27115 40435 32357 45335 
chi2  569147.51 6218.23 100122.39 4112.35 28995.86 30429.20 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.06 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.12 
Log  likelihood  -34908 -50226 -32694 -44364 -34829 -47972 
 
Reference income is calculated for each cross-section as the average net income per capita by type of locality 
(rural, urban or cities over 100 0 00 inhabitants).  Controls include gender, age, age squared, education, location of 
residence, employment status, occupation, regional dummies, time trend, and yearly dummies. All standard errors 
(in brackets) are clustered at each cross-section. Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % 
level.    28
Appendix 
 
Brief description of Polish political parties (addition to Table 1).  
SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej), a social democratic party issued from the pre-1989 communist 
party PZPR. Initially using anticapitalistic arguments and opposing privatization program, after 1997 
put accent on economic reforms, on joining NATO and UE. In 2001 the results for SLD include Unia 
Pracy (UP). In 2005 the results for SLD include SdPl (Socjaldemokracja Polska) which obtained 3.89 
% of votes. 
Samoobrona – a populist agrarian party, proposing a radical program of isolationism, protectionism, 
hostile to foreign investors, etc.  
UD/UW/PD (Unia Demokratyczna/Unia Wolnosci/Partia Demokratyczna) – three successive 
embodiments of a party of the centre: economically pro capitalistic, culturally and politically liberal 
KLD (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny) – a liberal party: it joined UW in 1994, and then left UW 
in 2001; its leaders contributed to the formation of  a new, more conservative party, Platforma 
Obywatelska (PO). 
PO (Platforma Obywatelska) was created in 2001 – a liberal-conservative party. 
AWS/AWS Prawicy (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc) – large coalition of  right-wing parties around 
Solidarity trade union. 
PC/PiS – a popular, nationalist, conservative party; since its formation PiS focused on fighting against 
post-communist left and against corruption. 
Other right – includes mostly right wing catholic parties, and some radically anticommunist and 
populist parties. They usually reject liberalism; defend Catholic Church and family values, and want to 
protect national interests against globalization, foreign capital, and the European Union 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics per date. Subjective variables, household income and the Gini 
coefficient calculated for each cross-section. 
 
Dates 
(year_month) 
Country 
satisfaction 
Private 
Expectations 
Private  
satisfaction 
Household 
income 
Gini 
coefficient 
1992_01  2.002  2.679  2.753                  
1992_05  1.944 2.531  2.613 5.454  0.323 
1992_07  2.036 2.849  2.640 5.528  0.331 
1992_09  2.060 2.742  2.635 5.569  0.312 
1992_10  2.147 2.707  2.652 5.515  0.339 
1992_12  2.108 2.453  2.610 5.467  0.320 
1993_01  2.124 2.637  2.659 5.516  0.353 
1993_03  2.126 2.641  2.677 5.528  0.355 
1993_05  2.085 2.741  2.713 5.527  0.324 
1993_07  2.124 2.700  2.628 5.490  0.325 
1993_09  2.272 3.046  2.663 5.486  0.379 
1993_11  2.347 3.169  2.720 5.532  0.347 
1994_01  2.343 2.924  2.788 5.488  0.351 
1994_03  2.235 2.704  2.703 5.407  0.345 
1994_06  2.437 2.886  2.738 5.471  0.357 
1994_07  2.462 2.861  2.769 5.514  0.347 
1994_09  2.379 2.733  2.818 5.510  0.337 
1994_11  2.426 2.859  2.749 5.542  0.323 
1995_01  2.521 2.928  2.832 5.546  0.339 
1995_03  2.430 2.952  2.809 5.519  0.336 
1995_05  2.526 2.904  2.851 5.573  0.306 
1995_07  2.599 2.963  2.847 5.569  0.353 
1995_09  2.574 2.931  2.841 5.566  0.339 
1995_11  2.606 3.117  2.868 5.683  0.358 
1996_01  2.943 3.137  2.975 5.650  0.364 
1996_03  2.786 3.041  2.911 5.574  0.348 
1996_05  2.702 2.988  2.938 5.614  0.329 
1996_07  2.699 2.953  2.923 5.668  0.336 
1996_09  2.724 2.941  2.959 5.675  0.329 
1996_11  2.771 3.006  2.925 5.691  0.342 
1997_01  2.745 3.072  2.906 5.726  0.371 
1997_03  2.687 3.028  2.987 5.728  0.344 
1997_05  2.840 3.048  3.023 5.807  0.332 
1997_07  2.895 3.029  3.074 5.749  0.324 
1997_09  2.939 3.141  3.005 5.794  0.352 
1997_11  2.866 3.052  2.985 5.801  0.328 
1998_01  2.771 2.929  3.000 5.720  0.337 
1998_03  2.769 2.965  2.942 5.706  0.354 
1998_05  2.774 2.988  2.967 5.797  0.337 
1998_07  2.721 2.957  2.991 5.822  0.339 
1998_09  2.746 2.878  2.943 5.834  0.352 
1998_11  2.699 2.923  2.997 5.823  0.353 
1999_01  2.706 2.889  2.945 5.805  0.347 
1999_03  2.457 2.830  2.879 5.735  0.363 
1999_05  2.471 2.828  2.912 5.818  0.342 
1999_07  2.396 2.749  2.875 5.823  0.345 
1999_09  2.330 2.814  2.882 5.879  0.353 
1999_11  2.431 2.840  2.941 5.856  0.350 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics per date. Subjective variables, household income and the Gini 
coefficient calculated for each cross-section (Cont.) 
 
Dates 
(year_month) 
Country 
satisfaction 
Private 
Expectations 
Private  
satisfaction 
Household 
income 
Gini 
coefficient 
 
2000_01 
 
2.490 
 
2.848 
 
2.874 
 
5.800 
 
0.372 
2000_02  2.427 2.781  2.889 5.755  0.365 
2000_05  2.320 2.792  2.904 5.827  0.365 
2000_07  2.339 2.751  2.826 5.775  0.337 
2000_09  2.375 2.854  2.882 5.814  0.359 
2000_11  2.348 2.834  2.830 5.779  0.354 
2001_01  2.383 2.844  2.896 5.787  0.328 
2001_03  2.201 2.770  2.809 5.791  0.368 
2001_05  2.198 2.781  2.842 5.783  0.351 
2001_07  2.098 2.841  2.864 5.840  0.377 
2001_09  2.147 2.879  2.846 5.811  0.340 
2001_11  2.077 2.899  2.870 5.811  0.378 
2002_01  2.071 2.834  2.881 5.831  0.361 
2002_03  2.056 2.791  2.849 5.779  0.375 
2002_05  2.071 2.788  2.835 5.824  0.379 
2002_07  2.035 2.839  2.864 5.885  0.389 
2002_09  2.160 2.876  2.910 5.820  0.366 
2002_11  2.247 2.885  2.906 5.852  0.357 
2003_01  2.249 2.867  2.914 5.832  0.373 
2003_03  2.111 2.836  2.880 5.822  0.355 
2003_05  2.060 2.873  2.900 5.864  0.363 
2003_07  2.134 2.804  2.882 5.806  0.356 
2003_09  2.188 2.887  2.997 5.819  0.360 
2003_11  2.120 2.683  2.917 5.778  0.369 
2004_01  2.257 2.864  2.920 5.822  0.372 
2004_03  2.121 2.772  2.934 5.802  0.381 
2004_05  2.370 2.924  2.982 5.882  0.367 
2004_07  2.323 2.891  2.942 5.786  0.351 
2004_09  2.451 2.939  3.007 5.811  0.369 
2004_11  2.445 2.902  2.961 5.773  0.355 
2005_01  2.541 2.981  2.980 5.737  0.363 
2005_03  2.415 2.966  2.926 5.747  0.351 
2005_05  2.525 3.073  2.965 5.809  0.362 
2005_07  2.371 2.903  2.989 5.782  0.369 
2005_09  2.471 2.974  2.971 5.776  0.365 
2005_11  2.588 3.123  3.037 5.778  0.377 
2000_11  2.348 2.834  2.830 5.779  0.354 
2001_01  2.383 2.844  2.896 5.787  0.328 
2001_03  2.201 2.770  2.809 5.791  0.368 
2001_05  2.198 2.781  2.842 5.783  0.351 
        
Country satisfaction:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 
“very good”. Private expectations: Do you think that in a year your life and the life of your family will be: 
Answers from 1”much worse” to 5”much better” than now. Private satisfaction: How do you and your family 
live? Answers from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good”.  Household income is the logarithm of net total monthly 
household income per capita, deflated by the monthly CPI. Gini coefficients are calculated for each successive 
representative cross-section.     31
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics. The socio-demographic structure of the sample, yearly 
averages. 
 
year 
 
Female 
 
Age 
 
Secondary 
education 
 
Rural areas 
 
Urban 
areas 
 
Large cities 
          
1992 0.55 46.77  0.34  0.42  0.52  0.28 
1993 0.55 47.93  0.35  0.42  0.52  0.28 
1994 0.48 47.89  0.37  0.40  0.53  0.28 
1995 0.55 48.24  0.37  0.40  0.51  0.29 
1996 0.55 47.61  0.39  0.37  0.55  0.28 
1997 0.57 47.53  0.41  0.37  0.52  0.31 
1998 0.56 47.74  0.41  0.37  0.53  0.30 
1999 0.56 48.17  0.43  0.37  0.52  0.30 
2000 0.55 48.13  0.45  0.37  0.50  0.32 
2001 0.56 47.86  0.44  0.36  0.49  0.32 
2002 0.55 48.46  0.46  0.35  0.46  0.35 
2003 0.55 47.82  0.46  0.37  0.47  0.33 
2004 0.52 46.89  0.46  0.41  0.51  0.29 
2005 0.53 46.73  0.44  0.37  0.51  0.30 
 
Large cities are defined as having more than 100 000 inhabitants.Table A2 continued. 
 
year 
 
Unemployed 
 
Pensioners 
 
Farm 
 
Not working 
 
Unqualified 
workers 
 
Qualified 
workers 
 
Higher 
occupations 
 
Self-employed 
 
Employees 
               
1992  0.08  0.34 0.11 0.07  0.06 0.14  0.06  0.03  0.15 
1993  0.05  0.44 0.09 0.03  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.13 
1994  0.04  0.45 0.09 0.02  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.13 
1995  0.06  0.43 0.08 0.04  0.04 0.10  0.06  0.04  0.12 
1996  0.08  0.37 0.07 0.06  0.04 0.10  0.07  0.04  0.15 
1997  0.08  0.35 0.06 0.06  0.04 0.10  0.08  0.04  0.16 
1998  0.07  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.04 0.09  0.07  0.04  0.16 
1999  0.08  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.04 0.09  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2000  0.09  0.37 0.06 0.05  0.03 0.08  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2001  0.12  0.37 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.08  0.06  0.04  0.16 
2002  0.13  0.37 0.05 0.04  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2003  0.12  0.35 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2004  0.12  0.34 0.06 0.05  0.03 0.07  0.07  0.04  0.16 
2005  0.11  0.33 0.05 0.05  0.04 0.08  0.05  0.03  0.17 
               
 Table A3. Descriptive statistics. Macroeconomic variables 
 
  
Year 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
 
Real GDP 
growth 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
 
Gini coefficient 
(our data) 
 
Gini coefficient 
UNICEF data 
          
1992 114243  102,6  13,1  .325  0.274 
1993 155780  103,8  14,9  .348  0.317 
1994 210377  105,2  16,5  .343  0.323 
1995 306318  107,0  15,2  .339  0.321 
1996 385448  106,2  14,4  .342  0.328 
1997 469372  107,1  11,6  .342  0.334 
1998 549467  105,0  10,0  .345  0.326 
1999 665688  104,5  11,9  .350  0.334 
2000 744378  104,3  13,9  .359  0.345 
2001 779564  101,2  16,1  .356  0.341 
2002 808578  101,4  17,7  .371  0.353 
2003 843156  103,9  18,0  .363  0.356 
2004 924538  105,3  19,6  .366  - 
2005 982565  103,6  18,2  .325 
 
- 
Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS). Gini coefficients calculated on yearly average 
household income in our data. The estimates of Gini coefficient from UNICEFF Database (IRC 
TransMONEE 2005) are based on interpolated distributions from grouped data from household 
budget surveys reported to MONEE project.   34
 
 
Table A4. Basic regressions of satisfaction variables. Ordered logit  
 
  Country 
satisfaction 
Private 
expectations 
Private 
satisfaction 
 
Gender -0,061***  -0,119***  -0,097*** 
 [0,021]  [0,017]  [0,014] 
Age -0,031***  -0,076***  -0,090*** 
 [0,003]  [0,005]  [0,005] 
Age squared  0,000***  0,001***  0,001*** 
 [0,000]  [0,000]  [0,000] 
Log household income  0,334***  0,336***  1,277*** 
 [0,016]  [0,019]  [0,018] 
Education 0,117***  0,051***  0,293*** 
 [0,024]  [0,019]  [0,017] 
Rural -0,152***  0,076***  0,236*** 
 [0,022]  [0,022]  [0,021] 
Large city  -0,022  -0,041*  -0,196*** 
 [0,025]  [0,025]  [0,022] 
Unemployed -0,032  0,01  -0,537*** 
 [0,028]  [0,037]  [0,042] 
Pensioners -0,110***  -0,222***  -0,611*** 
 [0,023]  [0,031]  [0,030] 
Farm -0,173***  -0,05  -0,05 
 [0,034]  [0,041]  [0,048] 
Unqualified worker  -0,085**  -0,150***  -0,319*** 
 [0,034]  [0,043]  [0,040] 
Qualified worker  -0,02  -0,058**  -0,111*** 
 [0,031]  [0,029]  [0,030] 
Not working  0,133***  0,109**  -0,160*** 
 [0,039]  [0,046]  [0,039] 
Higher professions  0,189***  0,139***  0,309*** 
 [0,038]  [0,037]  [0,035] 
Entrepreneur 0,041  0,380***  0,453*** 
 [0,047]  [0,051]  [0,049] 
Students 0,211***  -0,164***  0,161*** 
 [0,041]  [0,054]  [0,059] 
West -0,076**  0,056*  -0,169*** 
 [0,031]  [0,029]  [0,030] 
Centre-West -0,017  -0,096**  0,024 
 [0,030]  [0,038]  [0,026] 
Centre -0,132***  -0,082***  -0,210*** 
 [0,029]  [0,027]  [0,024] 
East -0,204***  -0,136***  0,050* 
 [0,039]  [0,038]  [0,029] 
South-east -0,083***  -0,171***  0,061* 
 [0,030]  [0,030]  [0,032] 
South-west 0,149***  -0,023  0,126*** 
 [0,031]  [0,033]  [0,027] 
Time trend  0,003  0,009  -0,004 
 [0,007]  [0,008]  [0,003]   35
 
Table A4. Basic regressions of satisfaction variables. Ordered logit  (Cont.) 
 
  
Country 
satisfaction 
 
Private 
expectations 
 
Private 
satisfaction 
 
cut1:Constant  0,843 0,696 0,507 
  [2,914] [3,324] [1,199] 
cut2:Constant 3,314  2,536  2,472** 
  [2,918] [3,319] [1,197] 
cut3:Constant 5,325*  5,121  5,339*** 
  [2,922] [3,311] [1,198] 
cut4:Constant 9,866***  8,287**  9,070*** 
  [2,914] [3,311] [1,202] 
     
Nb  of  observations  73581 67550 77692 
chi2 4753  2651  17249 
Pseudo R2  0,05  0,03  0,11 
log likelihood  -85274  -77445  -83015 
      
 
Country satisfaction:  How do you assess current economic situation in Poland? Answers 
from 1 “very bad” to 5 “very good”. Private expectations: Do you think that in a year your 
life and the life of your family will be: Answers from 1”much worse” to 5 ”much better” 
than now. Private  satisfaction: How do you and your family live? Answers from 1 “very 
bad” to 5 “very good”.  
Yearly dummies included. Omitted variables: men, education less than secondary, medium 
cities (less than 100 000), employees, and north region. Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level.  Error terms are clustered for each cross-section. Error 
terms are clustered for each cross-section. 
   36
Table A5.  Country satisfaction: controlling for seasonality. 
                     Ordered logit 
  
Country satisfaction 
 
 1992-1996  1997-2005 
 
Gini index  4,893***  -6,445*** 
 [1,882]  [1,902] 
_Imonth_2   0,07 
   [0,107] 
_Imonth_3 -0,230**  -0,269*** 
 [0,107]  [0,103] 
_Imonth_5 -0,207**  -0,185** 
 [0,104]  [0,085] 
_Imonth_6 -0,088   
 [0,105]   
_Imonth_7 -0,177*  -0,241*** 
 [0,104]  [0,087] 
_Imonth_9 -0,237***  -0,117 
 [0,091]  [0,109] 
_Imonth_10 -0,082   
 [0,107]   
_Imonth_11 -0,209  -0,095 
 [0,130]  [0,091] 
_Imonth_12 -0,16   
 [0,099]   
Nb of 
observations 
30520 43061 
chi2 7479  8344 
Pseudo R2  0,06  0,06 
log likelihood  -34874  -50162 
 
Controls include gender, age, age squared, education, location of 
residence, employment status, occupation, regional dummies, 
time trend, and yearly dummies. All standard errors are clustered 
at each cross-section. Asterisks *, ** and *** denotes 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 % level.  
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